Add zizmor as a pre-commit hook by AlexWaygood · Pull Request #626 · python/typing_extensions

AlexWaygood · 2025-07-07T13:20:48Z

Zizmor is a linter that checks GitHub workflow files for security vulnerabilities. We run it in CI for Ruff and uv over at Astral. Since typing_extensions is a top-10 PyPI package and take security pretty seriously in general, I think it makes sense for this repo to add it as a pre-commit hook too.

On main, zizmor has the following complaints regarding our GitHub workflows:

Zizmor complaints

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/ci.yml:59:9
   |
59 |       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
   |         ------------------------- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:26:9
   |
26 |       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
   |         ------------------------- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:54:9
   |
54 |       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
   |         ------------------------- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:80:9
   |
80 |       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
   |         ------------------------- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:105:9
    |
105 |       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    |         ------------------------- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
  --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:32:50
   |
32 |         run: python scripts/check_package.py ${{ github.ref }}
   |         ^^^ this run block                       ^^^^^^^^^^ may expand into attacker-controllable code
   |
   = note: audit confidence → High
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

error[unpinned-uses]: unpinned action reference
   --> .github/workflows/publish.yml:149:9
    |
149 |         uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1
    |         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ action is not pinned to a hash (required by blanket policy)
    |
    = note: audit confidence → High

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:62:9
   |
62 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
   |  _________-
63 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
64 | |         with:
65 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
   | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
  --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:93:9
   |
93 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
   |  _________-
94 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
95 | |         with:
96 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
   | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
   |
   = note: audit confidence → Low
   = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:130:9
    |
130 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
131 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
132 | |         with:
133 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:167:9
    |
167 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
168 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
169 | |         with:
170 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:204:9
    |
204 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
205 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
206 | |         with:
207 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:248:9
    |
248 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
249 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
250 | |         with:
251 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:283:9
    |
283 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
284 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
285 | |         with:
286 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:325:9
    |
325 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
326 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
327 | |         with:
328 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
   --> .github/workflows/third_party.yml:361:9
    |
361 |         - name: Checkout typing_extensions
    |  _________-
362 | |         uses: actions/checkout@v4
363 | |         with:
364 | |           path: typing-extensions-latest
    | |________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
    |
    = note: audit confidence → Low
    = note: this finding has an auto-fix

The three rules that have violations are:

artipacked:
- Docs: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#artipacked
- Writeup of how this was previously exploited: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-repo-artifacts-leak-tokens/
template-injection: this is the motivation for this change in publish.yaml:
```
- run: python scripts/check_package.py ${{ github.ref }}
+ env:
+   GITHUB_REF: ${{ github.ref }}
+     run: python scripts/check_package.py "${GITHUB_REF}"
```
- Docs: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#template-injection. The docs here also explain why the diff above fixes this vulnerability.
- Writeup on the GitHub blog: https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/
unpinned-uses
- Docs: https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#unpinned-uses
- Writeup of how this was previously exploited: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-actions-supply-chain-attack/

srittau · 2025-07-07T13:30:36Z

Not a blocker, but is it possible to add pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish to a whitelist for unpinned-uses? PyPA is certainly considered trusted by us (and could do a lot more damage in other ways), and not always using the latest version of the workflow is probably more of a potential security problem.

AlexWaygood · 2025-07-07T13:37:42Z

Not a blocker, but is it possible to add pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish to a whitelist for unpinned-uses? PyPA is certainly considered trusted by us (and could do a lot more damage in other ways), and not always using the latest version of the workflow is probably more of a potential security problem.

We could do, but I note that even the README of the gh-action-pypi-publish GitHub action recommends that you pin to a SHA (linking to https://julienrenaux.fr/2019/12/20/github-actions-security-risk/), and in their SchemaStore entry I read this under the description field:

We strongly recommend that you include the version of the action you are using by specifying a Git ref, SHA, or Docker tag number. If you don't specify a version, it could break your workflows or cause unexpected behavior when the action owner publishes an update. Using the commit SHA of a released action version is the safest for stability and security.

srittau · 2025-07-07T13:44:39Z

Meh, I don't agree with the reasoning. As far as I know, conventional wisdom is that you should always update to the latest version of a dependency – unless you performed a security audit of the specific version of the dependency or monitor updates for the (lack of) security fixes religiously. Old and compromised versions in the dependency chain are probably one of the biggest security problem, which is why stuff like dependabot and renovate was developed after all.

That said, if they recommend that themselves, so be it.

AlexWaygood added 3 commits July 7, 2025 14:12

Add zizmor as a pre-commit hook

dae988d

Merge branch 'main' into zizmor

457a37e

.

2035a54

AlexWaygood closed this Jul 7, 2025

AlexWaygood reopened this Jul 7, 2025

JelleZijlstra approved these changes Jul 7, 2025

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srittau approved these changes Jul 7, 2025

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srittau merged commit 3b9b86e into main Jul 7, 2025
86 of 104 checks passed

srittau deleted the zizmor branch July 7, 2025 13:45

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Add zizmor as a pre-commit hook#626

Add zizmor as a pre-commit hook#626
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